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Abstract 
 
 
 The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans‟ sense 
of fairness. In the game, a “proposer” is given a sum of money and is told they can split it 
however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the 
division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder 
can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most 
western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains 
unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to 
present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with 
some studies finding the animals share humans‟ disposition to behave „fairly‟ and others 
concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin 
monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative 
behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the 
ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens 
representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other 
inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the 
tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a “dictator game” 
where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) 
were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active 
participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the 
subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the 
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partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter 
for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject‟s offer by 
refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was 
conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option 
rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner‟s cooperation in the task. 
Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more 
often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant 
difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional 
occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), 
subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may 
indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a 
conspecific‟s reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual 
cost associated with behaving prosocially.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 Altruistic behavior is seen throughout the animal kingdom. The most extreme 
examples commonly referenced are the obligatory sterile eusocial castes seen in the ants, 
bees, wasps, and termites (Boomsma 2009). This form of altruism (and many others) can 
be explained by Hamilton‟s rule, which demonstrates that altruistic behavior can be 
evolutionarily maintained if the cost to the actor is less than the benefit to a relative 
(Hamilton 1964). Altruism between non-kin can also be readily observed in the wild. 
Reciprocal altruism, where non-kin interact with one another in exchange for a future 
reward instead of an immediately tangible reward (Hattori, Kuroshima, & Fujita 2005), 
can often explain seemingly altruistic behavior. Reciprocal altruism has been 
demonstrated in many different organisms, such as pied flycatchers (Ficedulla 
hypoleuca: Krams, Krama, Iguane, & Mand 2008), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella: 
Hattori et al. 2005), mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx: Schino & Pellegrini 2009) and 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes: Hockings, Humle, Anderson, Biro, Sousa, Ohashi, & 
Matsuzawa 2007). Human (Homo sapiens) altruism goes beyond simple reciprocal 
altruism. It is common to see humans helping others, kin and non-kin, and even 
sometimes people they have never met before (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Why do 
humans behave this way? One possible explanation is that altruism is a cultural construct. 
Another possible explanation is that humans have an inherent sense of fairness that 
motivates us to cooperate (Warneken & Tomasello 2009). 
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Having a sense of fairness is valuable to species that are highly cooperative 
because it allows cooperators to assess whether the rewards of the joint effort are fair, and 
to avoid or punish cheaters (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Is a sense of fairness unique to 
humans? In order to address this question we must analyze what it means to have a sense 
of fairness.  
One behavior thought to be important in assessing an organism‟s sense of fairness 
is an aversion of inequity. Being able to appraise the outcome of an interaction between 
you and another individual is essential for understanding whether the result is fair or not.  
Different cultures have different standards for fairness (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, 
Fehr, Gintis, & McElreath 2001), but in all cases humans possess the unique ability to 
express their dislike of an inequitable outcome through the use of language. Non-human 
primates (hereafter referred to as primates) are unable to use expressions such as “that‟s 
not fair,” so assessing their aversion to inequity becomes more difficult. New research 
may have demonstrated an aversion to inequity in a number of primate species 
(capuchins; Brosnan & de Waal 2003, Fletcher 2008, see also Sheskin, Ashayeri, Skerry, 
& Santos 2014, chimpanzees; Brosnan, Schiff, & de Waal 2005 see also Jensen, Call, & 
Tomasello 2007). In an important study by Brosnan and de Waal (2003), capuchins 
demonstrated an aversion to inequity when presented with a less valued food reward for 
performing a task, compared to a conspecific performing the same task. Capuchins were 
trained to hand a rock back to the experimenter in exchange for a food reward. Subjects 
would readily trade the rock for a cucumber slice when both subjects received this low 
value reward, but when the subject viewed a conspecific receiving high value grapes as a 
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reward for the same behavior, subjects found the cucumber to be unacceptable. A 
possible alternative explanation for this behavior is that when the subjects were in the 
presence of the higher value reward their outcome expectation was unmet and this caused 
them to refuse the lower value reward. However, an analysis of refusal rate between the 
inequity testing condition and a food control (where grapes were placed into an empty 
chamber where no conspecific was present) refutes this alternative explanation. In the 
inequity condition subjects increased their rate of refusals as they continued to watch the 
conspecific receive the higher value reward, while in the food control condition subjects 
decreased their rate of refusal as they realized they would not be getting the grapes and 
„settled‟ for the cucumber. This study demonstrated that capuchins were sensitive to the 
outcome of another monkey‟s behavior, and were averse to receiving a less valuable 
reward than a conspecific after the same amount of effort. 
The use of experimental economics games is often utilized to measure human 
responses to different equitable and inequitable outcomes and test our sense of fairness 
(Roth, Prasnikar, Zamir, & Okuno-Fujiwara 1991). In testing humans‟ aversion to 
inequity, researchers often use the ultimatum game (UG) and the dictator game (DG). In 
the UG, one participant, a proposer, is given a sum of money that they can split with their 
partner into whatever division the proposer decides upon (e.g., 100/0, 50/50, etc.). This 
division is then offered to the partner to either accept or reject. If the partner accepts the 
offer then both participants get the selected distribution, and if the partner rejects it, 
neither participant receives anything (Camerer & Thaler 1995). In the DG, the set-up is 
the same, but the partner does not have the opportunity to reject the offer (Forsythe, 
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Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton 1994). In an experiment conducted in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, 
and the United States (Roth et al. 1991), experimenters found that subjects all responded 
similarly to the UG scenario, giving on average 40 to 50 percent of the total money 
available, significantly higher than expected if the subjects were responding according to 
a rational maximizing strategy. Under a rational maximizing strategy the proposer should 
offer the lowest possible division and the partner should accept anything greater than 
zero, and yet humans routinely reject offers less than 20 percent of the total (Jensen et al. 
2007). A proposed explanation for this behavior is humankind‟s development of a 
cultural construct about fairness, with the behavior stemming from an attempt to “punish” 
the selfish proposer (Camerer 2003).  
Primates have demonstrated prosocial behavior (chimpanzees; Horner, Carter, 
Suchak, & de Waal 2011, capuchins; de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenber 2008, see also 
Liemgruber, Ward, Widress, Norton, Olsen, Gray, & Santos 2014) and aversion to 
inequity, but testing them on a paradigm like the human UG where the partner has an 
influence on the outcome is relatively new. The participation of the partner is an 
important distinction from previous experiments because in past studies on prosocial 
behavior and inequity aversion the subject did not need to be sensitive to their partner‟s 
outcome. They could merely act in a reward maximizing way without necessarily being 
aware of their effect on the partner‟s outcome. In the recent past there have been a few 
studies attempting to answer this question of how primates behave when presented with 
the ultimatum game scenario (Proctor, Williamson, de Waal, & Brosnan 2013, Kaiser, 
Jensen, Call, & Tomasello 2012, Jensen et al. 2007).  
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Jensen et al. (2007) tested chimpanzees on their responses to a mini ultimatum 
game through use of a bar-pull apparatus. Subjects (proposers) were presented with two 
trays baited with two bowls containing differential amounts of food reward on one tray, 
in which the proposer would get a larger amount, and equal amounts of food in each bowl 
on the other tray. As a proposal, the subject could pull a rope attached to one of the trays 
and bring the tray closer and within reach of a partner chimpanzee (responder). The 
responder could then „accept‟ or „refuse‟ the offer by pulling (or not pulling) the tray the 
rest of the way to the caging where it and the proposer could reach the displayed food 
reward distribution. The results of the study indicated that chimpanzees were not averse 
to inequitable outcomes, as very few unfair offers were ever rejected. Because the 
responders readily completed the task (pulling the rope and accepting the reward 
distribution) despite unfair distributions that most humans refused in similar studies, the 
authors concluded that chimpanzees are not sensitive to fairness. There were, however, 
some methodological concerns to be considered when evaluating this study. The study 
used an apparatus that was fairly complex and, thus, may have prevented the subjects 
from understanding the outcome of their actions.  
Another issue with the method was the presence of a visible food reward. 
Chimpanzees have demonstrated that the presence of an immediate food reward can 
cloud understanding and decision-making in a food quantity task. In a study by Boysen 
and Bernston (1995), chimpanzees were given a task where they could select between 
two quantities of food, and whichever bowl of food they selected was given to their 
partner while the subject received the unselected bowl. When the chimpanzees were 
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presented with visible food rewards in the bowls (of varying quantities) they were unable 
to learn that they received the bowl they did not select, and consistently chose the bowl 
containing the most food. When the researchers switched from visible food to Arabic 
numerals, which the chimpanzees understood as quantities, the animals were able to learn 
to choose the smaller number in order to receive the greater number of rewards. This 
study demonstrated that visible food may adversely influence chimpanzee judgment.  
Another issue that Jensen et al. (2007) mentioned in the discussion of their article 
was the potential predisposition for subjects to pull a rope when presented with the 
apparatus. A control for this demonstrated that 36% of the time subjects would pull the 
rope even when there was no visible reward to be reached. The result may indicate that 
when the partners were presented with a bowl with food in it (even if it was a lower 
quantity to the subject) they may have been conditioned to pull the rope and complete the 
task. A final potential indicator of methodological flaws in the Jenson et al. (2007) study 
was the lack of behavioral response by partners when presented with the unfair food 
distribution. The researchers observed the partner chimpanzees demonstrate signs of 
behavioral arousal in less than 2% of the trials. In the Boysen and Bernston (1995) study, 
chimpanzees demonstrated significant behavioral distress when given a lower quantity of 
food than expected. The lack of behavioral response in the Jensen et al. (2007) study may 
indicate that the partners did not understand the potential for a different outcome.  
Proctor et al. (2013) attempted to test chimpanzees with the ultimatum game, 
correcting some of the mentioned methodological concerns with the Jensen et al. (2007) 
study. The study used no complex apparatus, just tokens representing an equal or unequal 
 14 
 
 
reward distribution. The use of the tokens alleviated the potential distraction that visible 
food rewards may have presented. In the study, the experimenter would give the subject 
chimpanzee an option between the two tokens; one representing an unequal distribution 
of 5-1 banana slices in favor of the subject, and one representing an equal distribution of 
3-3 banana slices for both subject and partner. After token selection, the chimpanzee had 
to pass the token to their partner who could then return the token to the experimenter for 
a completed trial. If the partner returned the token to the experimenter, the selected 
reward distribution would be administered, and if the partner failed to return the token by 
not taking the token from the subject or failing to hand it to the experimenter within 30 
seconds, the trial would be considered a refusal and neither subject nor partner would 
receive any reward. The study found that chimpanzees demonstrated an initial preference 
for the selfish token, but eventually all four subjects shifted to a preference for the 
equitable reward distribution token. These results were significant because they showed 
for the first time that chimpanzees when presented with an ultimatum game paradigm 
adjusted their behavior to account for partner involvement. It was hypothesized that the 
chimpanzees were likely responding differently to how their behavior affected the partner 
and the potential for an offer refusal from their partner, but it was unclear which of these 
two factors (or both) were ultimately changing the subjects‟ behavior (Proctor et al. 
2013).  
The purpose of the present study was to test capuchin monkeys with a similar 
paradigm presented to the chimpanzees in the Proctor et al. (2013) study. Capuchins are 
more distantly related to humans than chimpanzees, but they demonstrate numerous 
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characteristics that are important for the development of a sense of fairness. Capuchins 
are a highly social species and are renowned for their tolerance of food sharing with 
juveniles and low-ranking individuals (Takimoto, Kuroshima & Fujita 2010). Like 
chimpanzees, capuchins have been observed to participate in group hunts with 
subsequent meat sharing (Perry & Rose 1994) and have demonstrated their 
cooperativeness in numerous studies (Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal 2006, de Waal & 
Berger 2000, de Waal et al. 2008, see also Visalberghi, Quarantotti, & Tranchida 2000). 
The high intelligence level and sociability of capuchin monkeys, combined with their 
tolerance for food sharing and high rate of cooperative activities, make them a likely 
species to demonstrate a sense of fairness similar to that of humans and chimpanzees.  
The current study attempted to replicate the Proctor et al. (2013) chimpanzee 
study using capuchin monkeys and a slightly modified methodology. I used the token 
transfer methodology used in the Proctor et al. (2013) study, where two differently 
colored tokens represented different reward contingencies (equitable and inequitable). 
One was selected by the proposer and offered to their partner to be traded to the 
experimenter for the rewards. Since capuchins could not be trained to pass a token to 
another monkey, I used the modification of a transfer container for token placement 
between the two subjects. During a trial, the proposer would select one of the two tokens 
and place it into the container which would then be moved within reach of the responder 
who could remove it and hand it to the experimenter to receive the reward distribution. In 
addition, instead of a quantitative reward distribution (5-1 vs. 3-3) a qualitative reward 
distribution was used (high and low value foods versus medium and medium value 
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foods). This modification was made because capuchins might not understand the relative 
numerous judgments between the reward contingencies, but they would readily 
understand foods of differing value. 
Based on past demonstrations of other-regarding preferences in capuchin 
monkeys (de Waal et al. 2008) and observed aversions to inequity (Brosnan & de Waal 
2003) when presented with a task where the partner could affect the outcome, the 
capuchins‟ results might resemble the chimpanzees. Subjects might select the unequal 
distribution token in the dictator game where the partner had no effect on the outcome, 
but switch to a preference for the equal distribution token in the ultimatum game when 
the partner was required to participate and could refuse the offer.  
 
Methods 
 
Subjects and Housing 
 
The subjects were three tufted capuchin monkeys that live in a socially housed 
colony of 17 animals in the Animal Behavior Laboratory at Bucknell University, 
Lewisburg, PA. The group was established from six animals in 2000 and all individuals 
were born in captivity. The dominance hierarchy was relatively stable since the group‟s 
establishment. The colony contained three matrilines of various sizes. The dominant 
matriline contained six females and one sub-adult male, one subordinate matriline 
contained six females and one juvenile male, and the second subordinate matriline 
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consisted of an adult female and an adult male. The dominant male had no maternal kin 
in the group. The three subjects were selected based on their previous experience with 
exchanging tokens for different reward contingencies. All three subjects were trained to 
associate three different value food rewards with three different metal tokens and could 
reliably differentiate between the tokens, selecting to exchange tokens based upon their 
observed food preferences. Subjects were one adult male, Davinci (Dv), and two adult 
females DeAngela (De) and Newton (Nw). The adult male tested was the subordinate 
adult male, and the two females were from each of the subordinate matrilines.  
The group‟s enclosure was made of a combination of plastic paneling and 
stainless steel welded-wire caging. The floors were linoleum covered with cedar 
woodchips. The entire enclosure consisted of three rooms with 17 interconnecting 
compartments averaging 2.0 x 1.8 x 2.4 m each. Compartments were connected by mesh-
wire doors that could be closed, and overhead tunnels in which a metal barrier could be 
inserted to seal off individual compartments. Compartments were furnished with perches, 
swings, and climbing structures to allow for natural movement.  
Subjects were fed twice per day, once in the morning with standard monkey 
biscuits, vegetables, and fruits and once in the afternoon with standard monkey biscuits, 
cereal, peanuts, and raisins. Water was available ad libitum. Enrichment was provided in 
the form of climbing and swinging structures as well as occasional children‟s toys. 
Behavioral testing was also considered a form of daily enrichment for participants. 
Subject participation in this study was entirely voluntary, and subjects could choose to 
 18 
 
 
stop participating at any point during testing if they wanted. The study was approved by 
the Bucknell University IACUC committee.   
 
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus consisted of a rectangular steel metal frame that was 0.57 x 1.18 x 
0.53 m with 2.54 x 5.08 cm caging wire separating the frame into three segments. The 
apparatus frame was placed on the doorways between two compartments (Figure 1). 
Capuchins could enter the apparatus from the two side segments of the apparatus that 
opened into the two larger adjacent chambers. The side segments were 0.57 x 0.29 x 0.53 
m and were closed with wire caging on five of six sides, with the sixth open side allowing 
the capuchins to enter. The middle segment of the apparatus between the two subjects 
was 0.57 x 0.61 x 0.53 m. An octagon shaped piece of wood was attached to the bottom 
of the frame to serve as a platform between the side segments. Two five cm tokens made 
of cut PVC pipe and spray painted yellow and blue were used for testing (Figure 2).   
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Figure 1: Apparatus set-up between the two larger chambers where the subjects 
entered. 
 
  
 Figure 2: Testing tokens made of PVC pipe spray-painted yellow and blue. 
 
 
Procedures 
 
Food preference test. Subjects were all presented with a food preference test to 
ensure food preference hierarchy was ordered as previously determined. Subjects were 
 20 
 
 
offered a choice between the high value food (banana chips) and the medium value food 
(apple) as well as a choice between the medium value food and the low value food (green 
pepper). All subjects preferred the foods in the expected order of value on all 15 trials for 
each food combination (binomial test p < 0.05). 
  
Color Preference test. Subjects were presented with a color preference test to 
ensure that they did not have a pre-existing preference for blue or yellow over the other, 
and thus a possible token preference. Subjects were presented with two colored squares 
and were required to reach out and select one before being rewarded with a pumpkin seed 
(for both colors). No subject preferred one color over the other on 12 or more trials out of 
15, which would have been a significant preference according to a binomial test (p < 
0.05). 
 
Subject training. The subjects underwent three training phases before they 
progressed to the testing phase. Subjects all had previous experience in token exchange in 
which they would take a token from the experimenter and then place it back in the 
experimenter‟s hand to receive a food reward. In training phase one, rather than placing a 
token into a hand before receiving a reward, subjects were trained to take a token from 
the experimenter‟s hand and place it into a clear, square container (16.5 x 16.5 x 5.7cm) 
placed on the apparatus (see Figure 1). Once they placed a token (a bolt or washer 
previously trained to be associated with a high value reward) into the container they 
received the reward. Once the subjects successfully placed the token into the container on 
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at least 10 of 12 trials over two consecutive days, which was significantly above chance 
according to a binomial distribution (p < .05), they moved on to the next phase of 
training. 
Training phase two tested the subject‟s ability to discriminate between tokens 
previously trained to represent high/low value rewards (washer for banana chip vs. 
carabineer for green pepper), high/medium value rewards (banana chip vs. bolt for 
apple), and medium/low value rewards (apple vs. green pepper). This phase was designed 
to establish that the subject preferred the rewards along the expected contingency, and 
was able to use tokens to represent the associated foods. During this training, the 
experimenter held up both tokens for the subject to select from and place into the clear 
container on a cart pushed up to a compartment into which the subject was separated. 
When the subject demonstrated understanding of the token contingencies (selecting the 
higher value token on 10 of 12 trials) on two consecutive days, they moved on to the next 
value pairing. After all three different value pairings were passed, the subject replicated 
the trials in the testing apparatus with the same protocol to move on to the next phase.  
The final training phase used new tokens; pieces of PVC pipe colored blue and 
yellow (Figure 2). This phase was designed to teach the subject the reward contingencies 
for each token. Training took place in the testing apparatus. The subject entered the 
apparatus from the same side every trial-block, while a naïve partner entered the opposite 
side. Token contingencies in this phase of training were representative of the testing 
token contingencies; the tokens represented either an equitable or inequitable reward 
distribution in favor of the subject. A naïve partner was used to ensure that he/she gave 
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no emotional response when seeing a selected token. The subject was trained with the 
blue and yellow tokens by first being presented with one token at a time that the subject 
could take from the experimenter and place in the container. The blue token represented 
an „unequal‟ rewards contingency where the subject received a high value reward 
(banana chip) while the partner received a low value reward (green pepper). The yellow 
token represented an „equal‟ rewards contingency where the subject and partner both 
received medium value rewards (apple). After three consecutive days of this training the 
subject was presented with both tokens side by side and allowed to select one to place in 
the container, after which the associated rewards would be given to subject and partner. If 
the subject successfully chose the token resulting in a higher value reward for themselves 
on 10 of 12 trials on two consecutive days they passed this final phase of training. If after 
three days of choice testing the subject had not yet reached an above chance level session, 
three more days of token training were completed before choice trials were repeated.  
 
Partner training. While subjects were being trained, I simultaneously trained the 
partner monkeys. Partner training consisted of three similar training phases as subject 
training. The first phase consisted of training the partner to take a token out of a container 
and place it into the experimenter‟s hand. This was done in preparation for testing, in 
which the partner would be required to select the subject‟s chosen token out of the 
container to return to the experimenter. Once the subject successfully completed this task 
on at least 10 of 12 trials on two consecutive days they moved on to the next phase of 
training.  
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Phase two of partner training was identical to phase two of subject training, 
testing the ability of the monkey to discriminate between tokens previously trained to 
represent high, medium, and low value rewards, with the only exception being that 
partners took the tokens out of the container instead of placing the tokens into it.  
The final phase of partner training taught the monkeys the token contingencies for 
the new PVC pipe tokens (blue and yellow). Partners would enter the apparatus and the 
experimenter would alternately place either the blue or yellow token into the container 
and slide it toward the partner who could take it out and hand it to the experimenter to 
complete a trial (receiving low value green peppers for the blue token and medium value 
apples for the yellow token). After three sessions of 12 trials the partner would be 
presented with both tokens side by side in the apparatus and allowed to make a selection 
of one to receive the associated reward. If the partner selected the token resulting in the 
higher value reward (yellow token) on 10 of 12 trials on three consecutive days they 
would pass this final stage of training.  
 
Testing 
Dictator game. The subject and partner were first presented with a dictator game 
(DG) scenario. The subject was presented with the two PVC tokens, which it could select 
and place into the container. The token was then removed by the experimenter for a 
completed trial and the respective token contingency was given to the subject and partner. 
The DG was used to assess a subject‟s initial token choice rates with the partner monkey. 
This differed from the training with a naïve partner because if the partner knew the token 
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reward representations they might express physical and vocal cues that could affect 
subject behavior. For this reason all DG trials (and all subsequent testing) were video 
recorded for later behavioral coding. Three sessions of 12 trials each were conducted with 
the DG. 
Ultimatum game. The ultimatum game (UG) procedure was identical to the DG 
methods except the partner became an active participant. During a trial the subject was 
presented with the two tokens and given the choice to select one and place it into the 
container, which was then slid toward the partner who could choose whether or not to 
take the selected token out and hand it to the experimenter for a successful trial (Figure 
3). If the partner did so, both the subject and partner were distributed the reward 
contingency associated with the subject‟s selected token. If the partner did not pick the 
token out of the container or grabbed the token and failed to return it to the experimenter 
within 30 seconds the trial was considered a refusal. Two experimenters were present at 
every trial. One experimenter would distribute the equitable reward contingency (apples) 
when the token was selected and the other would distribute the inequitable reward 
contingency (banana chip and green pepper). These roles were reversed every other trial-
block. The experimenters also reversed their role in the token selection and return, with 
one experimenter offering the tokens to the subject and the other sliding the container to 
the partner and extending an open hand for token return. This role was reversed every 
two trials.  
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Figure 3: Experimental set-up for Ultimatum Game. (1) Experimenter presents subject 
with token options, (2) subject places selected token in container that is then moved 
toward partner, (3) partner removes token from container and returns it to the 
experimenter. Experimenter 1 would offer the token to the subject and experimenter 2 
would accept the token from the partner, with these roles being revered every two trials. 
 
 
Analysis  
 
 A two-way Pearson‟s chi square test was run for each subject pair on token 
selection differences between the DG and the UG, and differences in token preference 
within each game. A one-way goodness of fit chi-square test was conducted on partner 
refusal rates after equitable and inequitable token selection by the subject.  
 
 
Results 
 
 
 
Dictator and Ultimatum Game Token Selection 
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Table 1 and Table 2 show the frequency of each token selection, chi-square 
statistic, and significance value for the Dictator and Ultimatum games respectively. In the 
DG, with both partners Newton chose the selfish offer (inequitable) token significantly 
more often that the equitable token. In the UG Newton also chose the selfish offer token 
significantly more often than the equitable one.  
 
Table 1 
Subject (Newton) observed frequencies of token selection and statistics for each partner 
pair in the DG.  
Partner Token Reward Distribution   
Subject Equitable Inequitable χ2 p 
Davinci 2 46 40.33 0.001 
 (24.0) (24.0)   
DeAngela 2 34 28.44 0.001 
 (18.0) (18.0)   
 
 
Table 2 
Subject (Newton) observed frequencies of token selection and statistics for each partner 
pair in the UG.  
Partner Token Reward Distribution   
Subject Equitable Inequitable χ2 p 
Davinci 9 242 216.29 0.001 
 (125.5) (125.5)   
DeAngela 4 68 58.89 0.001 
 (36.0) (36.0)   
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A chi-square test showed that for both partners there was no significant 
relationship between token selection and the dictator and ultimatum conditions (Davinci: 
χ² [1, N=299] = 0.038, p > 0.05; DeAngela: χ² [1, N=108] = 0.00, p > 0.05). Figures 4 
and 5 present graphic representations of the DG and UG data for each subject-partner 
pair, demonstrating the significant preference for the selfish offer token within both 
games and the lack of difference in token selection between games.  
 
Figure 4: Newton‟s percent token selection for the equitable and selfish offer 
tokens with partner Davinci in the Dictator and Ultimatum games 
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Figure 5: Figure 4: Newton‟s percent token selection for the equitable and selfish 
offer tokens with partner DeAngela in the Dictator and Ultimatum games 
 
 
 
Refusals 
  
During trials, partners could refuse an offer by failing to return the token to the 
experimenter within 30 s. Both subjects demonstrated refusals. A one-way goodness of fit 
chi-square analysis of refusals from the first half of the UG to the second found refusal 
rate to increase in both subjects as UG trials progressed, but the result was not significant 
(Table 3).  
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Table 3 
Change in observance of refusals between the 1
st
 half of UG trials and the 2
nd
 half. 
Partner Refusals over trials   
Subject 1
st
 half 2
nd
 half χ2 p 
Davinci 5 10 1.67 0.197 
 (7.5) (7.5)   
DeAngela 8 13 1.19 0.275 
 (10.5) (10.5)   
 
Token selection prior to a refusal did demonstrate a significant relationship. 
Refusal occurred after inequitable token selection compared to refusal following 
equitable token selection, with just one occurrence of refusal to the equitable token in 
both subjects (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Observed refusals by partner’s after subject selection of equitable or inequitable token 
Partner Refusal after token selection   
Subject Equitable Inequitable χ2 p 
Davinci 1 14 11.27 0.001 
 (7.5) (7.5)   
DeAngela 1 20 17.19 0.001 
 (10.5) (10.5)   
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Discussion 
 
When capuchins were presented with the both the dictator and ultimatum games 
they behaved selfishly and made decisions that resulted in the most favorable reward for 
themselves. Results more resemble the behavior of the chimpanzees in the Jensen et al. 
(2007) study, which found that subjects selected the inequitable reward distribution 
favoring themselves, than the behavior of the animals in the Proctor et al. (2013) study 
that this experiment was attempting to replicate. A key difference between the results of 
these previous studies testing primates on the ultimatum game paradigm and the present 
study was the occurrence of refusals. In both the Jensen et al. (2007) and Proctor et al. 
(2013) studies the responder never refused the offer. In this study, the two subjects did 
not refuse the offer at a very high rate, but refusals did occur, and when they did it was in 
response to the inequitable token. The opportunity for multiple ways to refuse the offer 
may have played a role in the occurrence of the response in this study as indicated by the 
different refusal techniques of the partner subjects. De typically refused an offer by 
leaving the testing apparatus when she saw the inequitable token had been selected and 
not returning until after the 30-s refusal time had passed. Dv‟s refusals took a different 
form, he would generally remove the token from the transfer container after it was 
selected, and then either drop it immediately or leave the apparatus with it, dropping it 
after a short period of time. This difference allowed for a greater range of refusal 
behavior compared to the Jensen et al. (2007) study, but the chimpanzees in the Proctor et 
al. (2013) study had the same opportunities so it does not completely explain the behavior 
in the capuchins.  
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Another interesting aspect of the refusal occurrences in this study was the lack of 
effect it had on the proposer‟s token selection. In both human ultimatum games (Cooper 
& Dutcher 2011) and chimpanzee ultimatum games (Jensen et al. 2007, Proctor et al. 
2013) the „fear‟ of refusal by the responder is considered a large factor in the rewards 
division decision of the proposer. When considering the chimpanzee studies, this is a 
particularly important distinction because, due to our inability to directly communicate 
with the primates, we must make certain assumptions about the animals‟ behavior and 
cognitive understanding. In both of the previously mentioned ultimatum games with 
chimpanzees, experimenters assumed the proposer subject had an understanding of the 
role of the partner, and thus comprehended the potential for a refusal, but since no 
responders ever refused, it is unclear whether the proposer ever understood what role 
their partner played in the task. When considering the significant results of the Proctor et 
al. (2013) study, this distinction may be important. The authors put forth two possible 
explanations for the change in token preference (from the inequitable rewards distribution 
to the equitable one) between the preference test and the UG. One was concern over the 
effect of their behavior on their partner, and the other was potential refusal from their 
partner. The authors do not claim to understand how these possibilities interact with one 
another and with the proposer‟s decision, but an underlying assumption of it all was the 
idea that the proposer was aware of the partner‟s potential impact on the outcome. It is 
interesting that in the Proctor et al. (2013) study, it was assumed that the potential for 
refusal was affecting the proposer‟s decision, even though the selfish token was initially 
preferred in the UG and the subject‟s preference shifted to the equitable offer token 
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despite there being no refusals. If the proposers were making token selection based on 
the potential for refusal, once they selected the selfish offer a number of times and were 
not contested they should have continued to behave selfishly instead of switching to a 
prosocial offer.  
The results of this study present almost the opposite behavioral conundrum. When 
the subject behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable rewards token it sometimes 
resulted in a refusal from the responder and subsequently no reward at all for the 
proposer. In this situation the proposer should have switched to the equitable reward 
distribution to receive a medium valued food reward (much better than no reward at all) 
but the subject in this study never responded with an equitable offer after the previous 
offer was rejected. One partner monkey (De) would often stop participating in the trial-
block completely after being offered the inequitable reward token a few times, but the 
proposer continued to select the selfish offer. While this „refusal‟ cannot be entered into 
the results because technically a trial with refusal didn‟t occur after the subject stopped 
participating, it is interesting that this behavior did not affect the proposer‟s behavior. For 
example, on one of the 12-trial blocks Nw offered De the inequitable token four times 
(three of which she refused) before De refused to participate in any further trials. During 
this trial block Nw received one banana chip before having her offer refused three times, 
resulting in no food reward, despite the fact that if she switched to the equitable offer she 
was likely to have received 11 apple slices. This behavior indicated that the subject may 
not have had an understanding of the role that their partner was playing. It is still 
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however unclear as to why the subject was not conditioned to prefer the equitable token 
after receiving no reward at all for selecting the selfish one.  
The chimpanzees in the Proctor et al. (2013) study switched to an equitable 
rewards preference in the UG despite no partner refusals. We cannot know whether the 
subjects were responding to the potential for a refusal, concern over their effect on their 
partner‟s outcome, or some other factor, but if the change in behavior after a lack of 
refusals indicates anything, it may have been that the chimpanzees were behaving out of 
an other-regarding preference. Since refusals were not that common in this experiment, it 
may have been the preference to behave prosocially (or not) that drove the subject‟s 
token selection. It has previously been demonstrated that capuchins have other-regarding 
preferences and behave prosocially when presented with a no-cost situation (Liemgruber 
et al. 2014, Takimoto et al. 2009, de Waal et al. 2008). It has, however, also been 
demonstrated that capuchins do not behave prosocially when presented with a situation in 
which they themselves are not receiving an equally valued reward (Skerry, Sheskin & 
Santos 2011). In the Skerry et al. (2011) study subjects were presented with tokens that 
could be placed in an apparatus to obtain a food reward. The subjects were not, however, 
located in the chamber containing the apparatus, and were instead in the adjacent 
chamber while a conspecific sat (tokenless) in the chamber with the apparatus. The 
subject could pass the (useless to them) tokens through an opening to the conspecific at 
no cost to themselves, but the subjects did not do this significantly often. This may 
indicate that without obtaining a tangible reward themselves, capuchin monkeys may not 
be quite so prosocial. 
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In the current study, the choice of the equitable token did institute a cost (however 
minimal) to the actor. If the subject selected the inequitable token they got their preferred 
food reward, and in order to behave „fairly‟ the subject had to forgo the preferred reward 
for a less favored food. The results of the Skerry et al. (2011) study may indicate that this 
decrease in food reward is too much for the capuchins to overcome, and their other-
regarding tendency is not strong enough to compensate for the „cost.‟ 
This study had several limitations. The primary limitation was the small sample 
size. The sample size was restricted due to limited available subjects with adequate 
background training, subjects being used in other experiments, and limited time for 
training for the current study. In addition, subjects had to be paired with similarly ranked 
individuals to encourage participation.  
Beyond subject size the biggest limitation that the current study faced was the 
issue of subject comprehension. While the task was not cognitively demanding, it 
remains unclear what the subjects understood to be occurring, and whether or not they 
comprehended how their behavior impacted the other conspecific they were paired with 
and how that could impact them. It is unclear whether the subject knew how her decision 
affected the responder, and this could be a potential explanation for why token selection 
was not changed after partner refusals. It also remains unknown whether the partner was 
refusing the token because of the „unfairness‟ of the reward contingencies, or simply 
because they did not want to participate in the task in exchange for a green pepper 
(despite exchanging a different token associated with green pepper readily in other 
contexts). The partner could have also been refusing based on an emotional response to 
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the inequitable rewards displayed (the mere presence of a higher value reward could 
cause the individual to refuse the lower value reward) and not comprehend the role the 
proposer played in creating this disparity.  
This study provided the first evidence of capuchin behavioral responses to the 
ultimatum game, indicating that they do not behave „fairly‟ like humans and the 
chimpanzees in the Proctor et al. (2103) study. This study by no means discounts a sense 
of fairness in capuchin monkeys, but it may indicate that capuchins do not have a strong 
ability to assess the impact of their behavior on a conspecific. It may also provide 
evidence that other-regarding tendencies in capuchins are overcome when behaving 
prosocially comes at a cost to the actor. Without a larger sample size it is difficult to 
extrapolate species-specific behavior from individual variation. Future studies should aim 
to play the ultimatum game with a large number of individual subjects. In particular, 
specific partner-subject pairings should be made, with the subject being subordinate to 
their partner. In a study by Takitmoto et al. (2010) it was discovered that capuchin 
monkeys behaved more prosocially when paired with a subordinate as compared to a 
dominant conspecific. In the present study, the subject-partner pairings were based on 
individuals of similar rank, but subject (Nw) was subordinate to partners (Dv and De). 
Alterations in methodology on the quantitative versus qualitative tokens could also prove 
valuable, in addition to attempts at training capuchin monkeys to hand a token to a 
conspecific directly as in the Proctor et al. (2013) chimpanzee study. The results of this 
study raise a number of questions that future research may be able to further elucidate.  
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